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Abstract 
We use a new legal dataset tracking changes in creditor protection law over several 
decades to study the impact of legal reforms on banking system development in India.  
Cointegration analysis is used to show that the strengthening of creditor rights in 
relation to the enforcement of security interests in the 1990s and 2000s led to an 
increase in bank credit.  We show that the change in the law was not endogenous to 
trends in stock market development and GDP per capita, and that the direction of 
causation ran from legal reform to banking development, rather than the reverse. 
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1. Introduction 
A substantial body of work has been devoted in recent years to the claim that legal 
systems shape financial outcomes.   In particular, the content of laws protecting 
shareholder and creditor interests has been shown to be associated with cross-national 
variations in stock market development and private credit respectively (La Porta et al., 
1998, Djankov et al., 2007).  However, these findings largely rest on the analysis of cross-
sectional data.   As such, they are subject to a number of limitations, in particular the 
possibility that changes to legal rules are endogenous to national contexts and 
macroeconomic trends (Rodrik, 2005).   
 
One of the main obstacles to resolving the issue of endogeneity has, until recently, 
been the absence of reliable time series.  This has now been addressed by the 
construction of longitudinal datasets which measure changes in the law over several 
decades (Lele and Siems, 2007; Deakin, Lele and Siems, 2007; Armour et al., 2008a, 
2008b).  The number of observations in these datasets and the length of the time series 
involved make it possible to use econometric methods that tackle the problem of 
endogeneity.  In this paper we introduce one of these new datasets, the Creditor 
Protection Index (CPI), and analyse it to study the effects of changes in creditor rights in 
India on banking development. 
2. The Creditor Protection Index 
The CPI is one of several datasets which have been recently developed to provide a 
quantitative indicator of legal change over time; others cover the fields of shareholder 
protection and labour regulation (Armour et al., 2008).   They draw on a wider range of 
legal materials and use a more finely-grained approach to coding than earlier studies.  
For example, the creditor rights index developed originally by La Porta et al. (1998) and 
more recently updated by Djankov et al. (2004) consists of just four variables: 
‘restrictions for going into reorganisation’, ‘no automatic stay on secured assets’, 
‘secured creditors first’ and ‘management does not stay’.  These are each coded on a 
binary (0 or 1) basis and the scores are then aggregated to provide a single indicator 
ranging from 0 (poor protection) to 4 (strong protection).   The CPI constructed by 
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Armour et al. (2008b) consists of 20 variables, some of which are broken down into sub-
variables, to give a total of 72 indicators in all.  The variables are grouped into three 
categories.  The first category, ‘debtor control’, refers to laws which restrict the activities 
of firms while they are going concerns, with a view to safeguarding creditor interests.  
These include laws setting minimum capital requirements and preventing sales of assets 
at an undervalue.  The second category, ‘creditor contracts’, is concerned with the 
powers granted by the law to creditors to take and enforce security over the firm’s 
assets.  The third group of indicators, ‘insolvency law’, refers, among other things, to the 
circumstances under which a firm can enter into bankruptcy, how far it can thereby be 
shielded from its creditors, the priority of creditors’ interests in insolvency, and the issue 
of who has control of the firm while the insolvency continues.  An algorithm sets out, for 
each variable, the basis for the coding process.  The sources for the coding are the 
original statutes and decisions of the jurisdictions concerned, and each change recorded 
in the index can be precisely traced to a primary legal source of this kind (this has not 
been the case with most earlier indices). 
The CPI covers the period from the mid-1970s to the present day for five countries: 
France, Germany, India, the UK, and the USA.  The CPI for India can be used to pinpoint 
legal changes which have taken place in relation to creditor rights in this period.  India, 
as a common law system, inherited from English law a broadly protective approach 
towards the interests of secured creditors; its score on the law relating to creditor 
contracts was comparable to those of the UK and USA for the period under review, and 
considerably higher than those for France and Germany (Armour et al., 2008b).  Indian 
law was strengthened at two points (see Armour and Lele, 2008).  The Recovery of Debts 
due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act 1993 set up new bodies, known as Debt 
Recovery Tribunals, to speed up the debt recovery process for both secured and 
unsecured loans through a summary procedure.  Then in 2002 the Securitisation and 
Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act gave the 
banks powers to enforce security interests without the need for a court order.  In the CPI 
these changes were coded by increasing the score on one particular sub-variable, 
measuring the enforcement of security without a court order, from 0 to 0.5 in 1993 and 
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then from 0.5 to 1 in 2008.  These were two of 27 changes to legal rules which are 
recorded in the CPI for India between 1970 and 2005. 
3. Econometric Issues, Model Specification and Data 
Our empirical investigation has two aims. The first is to examine the direct effect of 
creditor protection law on banking system development in India, conditioning on 
variables that previous literature has found to influence banking sector development, 
such as real income and stock market development.5  The second aim addresses the 
issue of causality between banking system development and creditor protection, which 
can shed light on the question whether legal reform leads or follows financial outcomes. 
We address the first aim by examining the statistical significance of CPI in a 
cointegrating system for banking system development which allows for the possible 
endogeneity of the regressors. Besides allowing the CPI to be endogenous, this 
accommodates all types of causal patterns between finance and growth.6 The second 
aim is addressed by carrying out a weak exogeneity test of the CPI with respect to 
banking system development. 
Our sample consists of 30 annual observations from 1976 to 2005. Formally we 
estimate the following linear system with four variables in semilogarithmic form (where 
ut is an error term), normalised for convenience on banking system development: 
LBYt = ao + a1LYt + a2LSMCt + a3CPIt + ut        (1) 
where LBY is the logarithm of the ratio of private bank credit to nominal GDP, LY is 
the logarithm of real GDP per capita  and LSMC is the logarithm of the ratio of stock 
market capitalisation to GDP.  The data on real GDP, bank credit, and stock market 
capitalisation were extracted from the World Bank Financial Structure Data Set (October 
17, 2007).  
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4. Empirical Results 
Unit root tests reported in Table 1 below suggest that the logarithms of LY, LBY, 
LSMC, and CPI are integrated of order 1 and that their first differences are stationary. 
Thus equation (1) has the interpretation of a cointegrating vector for LBY, in which the 
regressors are all I(1).  
TABLE 1: AUGMENTED DICKEY FULLER TESTS 
   
 ADF Statistic  
Variables Constant Constant and Trend 
LBY 1.3501 3.4626 
LY 2.8617 1.8049 
CPI -1.4798 -1.8961 
LSMC -0.2381 -3.8042** 
DLBY -3.3722** -3.2242*** 
DLY -5.1740* -6.7498* 
DCRI -5.7233* -5.6776 
DLSMC -5.8199* -5.1164* 
   
Notes: *, **, and *** indicate rejection of the unit 
root null hypothesis at the 1%, 5% and 10% level 
 respectively 
 
Using Johansen’s MLE procedure7, we find evidence of at most one cointegrating 
vector among the set of variables, using both maximum eigenvalue and trace test 
statistics (Table 2). The cointegrating vector, normalised on banking sector 
development, shows a positive relationship between banking system development and 
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 Estimations were carried out in PcGive. We also obtained similar results using Hendry’s dynamic single 
equation cointegration estimator. We prefer to report the results using Johansen’s procedure as it treats all 
regressors as potentially endogenous. 
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creditor protection, as well as a positive output effect. Stock market development is 
negatively related to banking system development, suggesting a possible crowding out 
effect. The hypothesis of weak exogeneity cannot be rejected in the case of output and 
creditor protection. The same hypothesis is rejected in the case of private credit and 
stock market capitalisation. Hence, there appears to be bidirectional causality between 
banking system development and stock market development whereas creditor 
protection is weakly exogenous to the cointegrating vector.  Thus, the effects of creditor 
protection can be interpreted in a causal sense. Given that the coefficient on CPI is 
significant at the 1% level, these results suggest that enhancements in creditor 
protection law have had a positive long run impact on financial development.8 
TABLE 2: JOHANSEN COINTEGRATION TEST WITH THE CREDITOR PROTECTION COMPOSITE 
INDEX 
   
2.A: Estimated Cointegrating Vector (LAG=2)         
Sample: 1976-
2005 Trace Statistic     
Maximum Eigenvalue 
Statistic   
  Ho:rank=p   Ho:rank=p  
 p=0 p≤1 p≤2 p≤3 p=0 p≤1 p≤2 p≤3 
 62.58* 27.5 13.62 6.1 35.07* 13.88 7.52 6.1 
Normalised on LBY   LY  CRI  LSMC    
Coefficient  1.8190  0.4279  -0.2297   
S.E.   0.4467  0.1512  0.1239    
Note:        
* denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 5% level.      
         
2.B: Weak Exogeneity Tests           
    LBY   LY   CPI   LSMC 
LR test statistic  4.3045  0.5738  0.0004  5.8047 
p-value   0.038   0.4487   0.9839   0.0159 
Note: p-values are that of the likelihood ratio tests under the null that the loading factor is zero. 
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 It is also worth noting that the qualitative nature of our main finding is robust to using alternative banking 
system development measures and adding variables such as the real interest rate – which was found to be 
insignificant - to the system. 
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 By construction, the creditor protection index is made of three sub-indices: debtor 
control, DEBT, creditor contracts, CREDIT, and insolvency, INSOLVENCY.  Further 
estimations have shown that out of the three sub-indices, CREDIT is the sub-index which 
appears to be driving our results. The results using Johansen’s MLE procedure and 
replacing the CPI with CREDIT are reported in Table 3.   Both the maximum eigenvalue 
and trace test statistics provide evidence of at most one cointegrating vector among the 
new set of variables.   
TABLE 3: JOHANSEN COINTEGRATION TEST WITH THE CREDITOR CONTRACTS SUB-INDEX 
   
3.A: Estimated Cointegrating Vector (LAG=2)         
Sample: 1976-
2005 Trace Statistic     Maximum Eigenvalue Statistic   
  Ho:rank=p   Ho:rank=p  
 p=0 p≤1 p≤2 p≤3 p=0 p≤1 p≤2 p≤3 
 64.47* 28.5 13.31 4.18 35.97* 15.19 9.12 4.18 
Normalised on LBY   LY  CREDITOR  LSMC    
Coefficient  0.1112  0.6316  -0.1478   
S.E.   0.3805  0.2021  0.0778    
Note:        
* denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 5% level.      
         
3.B: Weak Exogeneity Tests           
    LBY   LY   CREDITOR   LSMC 
LR test statistic  5.4547  9.0562  8.5578  2.5546 
p-value   0.0194   0.0026   0.0034   0.1099 
Note: p-values are that of the likelihood ratio tests under the null that the loading factor is zero. 
 
Once again the cointegrating vector, normalised on banking sector development, 
exhibits a positive relationship between banking system development and creditor 
contracts, as well as a positive but this time insignificant output effect. Furthermore, 
stock market development continues to be negatively related to banking system 
development. The latter, however, is now found to be weakly exogenous to the banking 
system development vector. This suggests that stock market development has no long-
run causal influence on banking system development but has an effect through the 
cointegrating parameter. The coefficient on LSMC is significant at the 10% level. Finally, 
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the weak exogeneity tests suggest a feedback relationship between banking system 
development, real GDP and creditor contracts since all three variables are now 
endogenous to the system.  
5. Concluding Comments 
Previous studies of the impact of legal change on financial markets, even when they 
used time-series data, were not able to overcome the problem that legal change may be 
endogenous to the economic cycle (Djankov et al., 2007: 323).  In this paper we have 
shown how legal datasets covering a long time series can be combined with 
cointegration analysis to throw new light on this question.  We saw, firstly, that legal 
reforms which strengthened creditor protection in India in the 1990s and 2000s were 
positively associated with banking development, measured by bank credit in relation to 
GDP per capita; secondly, that this association operated independently of trends in stock 
market development and GDP growth; and, thirdly, that the direction of causation ran 
from legal reforms to the growth of bank credit, rather than the reverse.   
Although India is a common law system, we cannot conclude from our analysis that 
its legal origin was, as such, the driver of legal change.  That would require a deeper 
analysis of relevant political and institutional forces (see Armour and Lele, 2008) and a 
comparison of India’s experience with that of civil law systems (as in Armour et al., 
2008a).   We have, however, seen that legal change can be a significant factor, in its own 
right, in shaping financial outcomes; and, specifically, that changes to the law governing 
the enforcement of security interests may be an important means of encouraging bank 
lending in a developing country context.   
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